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abstract
This paper offers an explanation on how the free market ideology 
gives rise to the social distinction of being considered a follower 
of democracy, but with the purpose of being admired from the 
social viewpoint. This only enhances the ceremonial feature of 
being a democracy follower. This habit of thought inculcated by 
the establishment supports pecuniary behaviors submerged in the 
state, and resigns excluded people to the apparently idea there is 
not alternatives for change. Understanding that the social process 
is complex continuously evolving, we propose several and basic 
elements to explain the negative influence of the establishment 
under its free market ideological discourse. 
Keyword: free market, ideology, ceremonial, establishment, 
institutional change.
JEL Codes: B52, O17, P17.
resumen 
Este artículo ofrece una explicación sobre cómo la ideología del 
libre mercado da lugar a la distinción social de ser considerado un 
seguidor de la democracia, pero con el propósito de ser admirado 
desde el punto de vista social. Esto solo mejora la característica 
ceremonial de ser un seguidor de la democracia. Este hábito de 
pensamiento inculcado por el establecimiento apoya conductas 
pecuniarias sumergidas en el Estado, y resigna a las personas ex-
cluidas a la idea aparente de que no hay alternativas para el cambio. 
Entendiendo que el proceso social es complejo y evoluciona con-
tinuamente, proponemos varios elementos básicos para explicar la 
influencia negativa del establecimiento bajo su discurso ideológico 
de libre mercado.
Palabras clave: libre mercado, ideología, ceremonial, estable-
cimiento, cambio institucional.
 Clasificación JEL: B52, O17, P17.
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1. INTRODUCCIÓN
We claim the ceremonial ideology of the free market is a source of 
social distinction. After the failure of the dictatorships, socialist 
attempts, and Economic Commission for Latin American and the 
Caribbean’s (ECLAC) industrialization policies proposals, there has 
been the need to enhance democracy in Latin American nations. The-
refore, development of capitalism through free market reforms thesis 
was received with hope between the end of the 80’s and the beginning 
of 90’s. Notwithstanding, the upshot has been the emergence of a 
predator government which works in coordinated action between 
big business groups and the political class leaving the middle class 
and poor excluded. Hereafter, we will refer to this as the institution 
of the establishment.
The scope of the analysis is focused on the prevalence of a structure 
which conditions an agency which in turn behaves in a manner that 
reinforces that structure. A key component of the structure in this case 
is the habit of thought of the establishment. This suggests that the 
establishment is an institution in the Veblenian sense. We talk about 
Latin American throughout this paper although it is well known that 
each Latin American nation has its particularities. Specifically, we deal 
with which are considered the general and commonplace features of 
this ceremonial aspect of free market ideology. Of course it will be 
cited the Colombian case as the source of insights, but at the same 
time avoiding a generalization from the Colombian situation. We 
use only few examples of the Colombian situation. 
This paper consists of four sections. The first section will examine 
the free market ideology and its ceremonial features. The second 
section will be focused on the players of the free market. The third 
section is centered on the institutions of the lack of trust. A fourth 
section is based on the study of insights for the institutional change 
from authors as Dewey, Veblen, Ayres, Commons, and Foster. The 
last section will offer some conclusions aiming to a road for changing 
the establishment.  
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2. FREE MARKET IDEOLOGY AND ITS 
CEREMONIAL FEATURES
We should establish a definition of the ceremonial free market ideo-
logy. The ideology tells us how the world works. It has an imposition 
tone, for human agents end up thinking there are not alternatives. 
Following this idea, free market economy is the foundation for the 
development of capitalism, and it is sustained by the conception of 
freedom. Freedom to choose is the flagship rhetoric that is to create 
a belief that market economies would be able to find democracy and 
peace (Friedman, 1962). That is the neoliberal message. The secret 
formula is just to promote free market capitalism and democracy will 
emerge as a by-product of it. 
Historically, the unregulated market was absent during the mer-
cantilist and feudal times, but those were periods where the social 
relations included man’s economy during those times. In a context 
where social relations do include man’s economy, men and women 
act not for the accumulation of material goods guided by his self-
interest, but to safeguard his social standing, and his social status. 
This means the division of labor is fixed by the social interactions 
among each member of society. In short, the economy is embedded 
in social relations and not the contrary (Polanyi, 1944). 
In looking for freedom in a democratic system, the change from 
a regulated market to a self-regulating one caused a complete trans-
formation in the structure of society. If we know a market economy 
only can work in a market society, we will appreciate the conversion 
of labor, land, and money as commodities i.e. the creation of the labor, 
land, and money markets. This change brought about a transforma-
tion of the conditions of people in society: poverty and misery, high 
unemployment, wealth accumulation by the high-income classes and 
other manifestations of social exclusion. But it also brought about 
the end of the Malthusian world via industrialization (Polanyi, 1944; 
1947). The market society destroyed the material prosperity of people 
who did not need the social institution of market to direct the social 
provisioning process. Before the market economy, people who later 
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are going to be socially excluded by the market were self-sufficient 
and had their needs provided. Only the power of an ideology could 
destroyed the material base that was effectively providing the needs 
of the people. For instance, the peasants in the late XVII century in 
England suffered from the fact the lords enclosured their common 
lands (where the peasants used to work and provide for themselves) 
and sent the “free peasants” without property to the “promising 
urban centers”, where manufacturing was starting to expand. Once 
there, the only option for them was to work for long hours without 
a decent wage (Humphries, 1990). 
Individualism arises and the idea that only through hard work the 
individual prosperity can be reached became the essential foundations 
of the economic life. Even religion played a role on it, the protestant 
ethics was functional to interest of the emergence of unfettered capi-
talism. Only through hard work salvation or at least signs of salvation 
can be seen. This individualistic perspective of life helps to separate 
men and women from the social aspect of the provisioning process. 
The production of goods and services is market-centered and does 
not respond anymore to the social needs (status or social distinction) 
that men and women have. Businessmen only look to maximize their 
profits, while consumers look to maximize their utility. All is reduced 
to a process of economic maximization. Whatever social consequence 
rises from that, it does not matter (Hunt, 2002; Sherman et. al., 2008). 
This alteration in people’s life conditions will be the reason 
whereby the economic liberalism responded to the challenge of the 
industrial revolution. The industrial revolution involves high social 
and human costs. Women, even while pregnant, had to work for 14 
to 18 hours a day in the factories. Several times they had to suffer 
sexual abuse as well. Also, children were used in the factories. The 
robber baron capitalist style of the day considered advantageous 
to have a bigger labor supply, and most important, a passive labor 
supply (women and children) who were not thinking about unioniza-
tion (Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982). Nevertheless, the laissez faire was 
kept to maintain law and order. It has officially become an ideology. 
When there was government intervention, this was motivated by 
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the countermovement, which not necessarily was anti-liberal, but it 
looked for an inclusive behavior of the free market, and the preference 
of collectivist view instead of an individualistic one (Polanyi, 1944). 
The point of Polanyi is to prove that without the double-move-
ment the market was doomed to disappear. As a matter of fact, with 
the double-movement the market could somehow accomplished the 
promise of providing material prosperity. For instance, the labor 
market could get stabilize due to all the regulations that formalize the 
relationship between the businessmen and workers. The regulations 
of working day length and the labor conditions on the shop floor 
contributed to make more efficient the process of production. This 
is why markets are social constructions and cannot be reduced to a 
simple intersection of two curves that relate quantitatively quantities 
and prices (Fligstein, 2001). 
Polanyi helps us to understand the transformation of the social 
structure under such economic system, but we have not described 
the ideological and ceremonial features of the free market. The 
ideological feature is what Polanyi (1947) called “the delusion of 
economic determinism as a general law for all human society”. 
This determines directly social classes, and, indirectly, other insti-
tutions. If we use tools to make possible social distinction, we will 
be involved in ceremonialism (Ayres, 1944). The Latin American 
case exhibits what Adkisson (2004) calls ceremonial encapsulation. 
He asserts that “ceremonial values are allowed to alter or otherwise 
limit the application of technologies instrumental in the process of 
social problem solving”. Technology should be taken here as a broad 
definition, precisely, as cumulative knowledge and not only tools or 
sophisticated machines.  The free market ideology is a tool in the 
sense its policy implications have been extended as the best way to 
reach democracy in those nations where the political instability is 
commonplace. To be a follower of the free market is to be a follower 
of freedom and democracy, and, precisely, this is the social distinction, 
at least in Latin America, which is our interest here.  
The free market itself is not enough to have democracy. Democracy 
is a social technology. It gives us guidelines about how to organize 
our decision-making in our societies. The fact that unfettered markets 
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allow people to freely buy and sell does not mean that democracy 
will rise to allow us to be politically empowered. Unfettered market 
economies do not allow democracy to rise, or at least limits it. Un-
regulated markets causes economic and social inequalities. It makes 
people different. People with different economic, political, and social 
status endowments have different levels of influence and access in the 
markets. Therefore, it is impossible to theorize that market economy 
automatically produces democracy. Democracy is a tool that can be 
used to harmonize the social tensions that unregulated markets ge-
nerates. Democracy is not a by-product of free markets. But it is the 
ceremonial idea that neoliberals have been promoting. 
3. WHO ARE THE PLAYERS IN THE MARKET? 
AND WHERE IS THE GOVERNMENT?
It is well-known that in Latin America, poverty, unemployment, 
wealth, land and income concentration, corruption, and privileged 
influences are extended although with some differences among the 
countries. The causes of these social problems can be found in an 
institutional explanation. Our concern here is not to explain the 
Latin American situation with respect to free market ideology from 
the Colombian case. The key point is to explain some general trends 
regarding institutional factors that Latin America countries share 
each other. Using a few examples of Colombia, we highlight how 
those general trends work in Latin America.
Those general trends can be identified answering the following 
questions: 1) who are the players of the market in Latin America? 
Answer: big business groups, the middle class, and poor people, 
who represent more than 50% of the population throughout Latin 
America. 2)  Where is the government? Answer: It is captured by 
politicians through a couple of ceremonial relations. On the one hand, 
there is the relation between big business groups and the political 
class, and on the other hand, poor people and the political class under 
the mechanism of clientelismo and the buying of votes.
As we have said the players in the market are big business groups, 
the middle class, and the poor. The poor are characterized by high 
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rates of illiteracy, high unemployment, precarious health conditions, 
lack of adequate public utilities, and living in condition of high risk 
due to the inadequacy where the poor neighborhoods are located. 
It is definite that they have rights to reach better conditions of life. 
But following Polanyi it is also true they receive their rights only on 
the paper because in this way the law and order will be kept. Not-
withstanding, beyond Polanyi, there is the mechanism of clientelismo 
to guarantee votes during the election times. Under clientelismo the 
poor know they have rights to claim solutions to their needs, but 
politicians offer to them a faster way by which they can have access 
to “public goods and services” through the exchange of “favors” for 
votes. The upshot is the poor is committed with the political pro-
posal/agenda without considering if it is convenient to them. Not 
only the clientelismo uses this strategy to gain votes, but it also uses 
the buying of votes1. These practices reproduce the lack of debate of 
ideas in politics, which is politics without considering policy agendas, 
proposals, or feasible goals.  
The middle class is comprised of manufacturing and banking 
workers, school teachers, university professors, independent workers, 
professionals, and temporal workers.  The middle class tends to be 
apathetic with respect to political affairs although it is divided on 
this issue. We can find members of the middle class that participate 
with enthusiasm and independence during every election. It is also 
possible to find some members serving to the political class. Given 
that this particular class has more information in contrast to poor 
people, clientelismo does not exert the same coercion as it does on lowest 
income group2. However, it is affected by the operation of clientelismo. 
1  A good reference for this particular issue can be found in Stokes (2003). 
She uses as methodology the game theory approach, the description of this 
particular problem (i.e. the buying of votes) in Latin American countries is 
widely used.  
2  Some evidence have been offered in Gamarra (2005) regarding to the 
lower the income the higher the political participation. What this means is 
that in Colombia, as in many countries of Latin American, poor people and in 
some degree middle class members are susceptible to the exertion of the inter-
est groups through clientelismo.   
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Middle class families do not find employment and to “cooperate and 
support” a politician could be the solution to the lack of job. 
The last member of the market is the big business groups. These 
are formed by independent companies in their functioning, but “they 
are linked through stockholder property or through the fact that the 
companies have a common owner, who is a single family. Neverthe-
less, it is often seen that the companies of the economic groups are 
linked by a combination of common owner and stockholder proper-
ty”. Moreover, these big groups have business in several economic 
activities such as the beverage industry, airlines, telecommunications, 
automobile manufacturing, food processing, banks, and insurance 
companies (Mason and Orjuela, 2003). Capital accumulation takes 
place on privileged hands. Cases of entrepreneurship are rare. 
In Colombia there are four big business groups: Bavaria Corpo-
ration, Ardila Lulle organization, Sarmiento Angulo organization, 
and the Group of Antioquia’s companies. They represent a 14% of 
GDP. In addition, they are big employers and big taxpayers (at least 
in proportion to their sales). They are generous sources of financial 
support to political campaigns, and owners of the main mass media. 
Regarding to its relationship with the structures of the government, 
these business groups have direct access to the decisive instances in 
the executive and legislative branches of the government. The im-
plementation of lobby is effective and overshadows any attempt that 
tries to bring more competition to the oligopolistic markets where 
they operate (Rettberg, 2003; 2001; Silva, 2004). A clear example 
of political and economic powers get interrelated and reproduced. 
The second question remains: what is the role of the government? 
It is captured by the politicians through two ceremonial relations-
hips: the relation between big business groups and the political class 
(through lobby practices), and between poor people and the political 
class under the mechanism of clientelismo. The government is absen-
tee. The rule of law loses its objectives. Governance gets weak and 
illegals groups (Guerrilla, Paramilitary, or organized crime) in many 
situations replace the presence the government. Nonetheless, the 
explanation we should provide is to answer why this type of behavior 
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works in Latin American societies. What is the habit of thought that 
is allowing this ceremonial feature is maintained? 
The neoliberal agenda promotes democracy as a consequence of the 
application of free market reforms. As we have asserted above, the view 
of the neoliberals is that if you want democracy, you should follow 
the free market path. This speech is sustained by those privileged 
players in the market. The big business groups use their influence 
to maintain rents. Few of them value the spirit of capitalists. Risk-
taking or entrepreneurship and innovation are not the favorite tools 
of Colombian capitalism. The political class, using clientelismo, makes 
sure its perpetual presence in the government. Recognized last names 
get established as political families.  Amidst all this there are poor 
people who only see as possible to get benefits from the government 
through this opportunistic political class. Finally, the middle class, 
which is fragmented, does not have strong commitments to partici-
pate for a better politics. The picture clearly shows neither a parti-
cipative democracy nor a market with a competitive characteristic. 
The orthodox view regarding markets, which states that competition 
will lead to the highest social benefit is utopian. 
Privileged social classes believe democracy is attainable through 
free market economy. Yet, this last part is only the surface of the rea-
lity. It is the tool to provide that social distinction (i.e. be a follower 
of the democracy). The free market ideology as a ceremonial feature 
of Latin American serves the establishment. This is not a physical 
thing, but a habit of thought. A habit of thought that is accepted 
by all these players, and all these players help to reproduce it. This 
is manifested in the functioning of Latin American societies. A habit 
of thought, using the Colombian case, that has its evolutionary roots 
during the colonial times, when the Spaniards found several forms of 
labor organization of the Natives and used them to obtain gold and 
servile labor. The political institutions had the centralized form of 
the Spaniard crown. There was not democracy to access public office; 
the public positions were sold, especially to Spaniards. In simpler 
terms, being a public servant was seen as pecuniary motive because 
it was an investment that should yield profits (Parada, 2006).  This 
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process of social relationships resulted throughout the time in a po-
sitive feedback which caused this habit of thought to be locked in. 
This involves us into a path dependence, which explains why the long 
lethargy to look for a positive social change in Latin America (Arthur, 
1990; David, 1985). In short, the establishment is the structure that 
has molded the agency, and this agency has acted as well to the extent 
it has helped the reproduction of the establishment. The process of 
self-questioning and deliberation with respect to this exclusionary 
reality has not started yet (Fleetwood, 2008).     
Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, a conservative leader, used the word esta-
blishment to describe that Colombian politics was under the domain 
of practices such as clientelismo, which subordinates national politics 
to the preponderance of money interests. This was the form in which 
the public opinion was decimated and the government was taken. 
This sheds lights on the idea that Colombian politics is no longer 
about how to administer the government to provide public services 
and goods, but an embedded system of acquired commitments to 
gain social status and prestige. This is the establishment, a system 
of commitments and complicities that is dominating the totality of 
the civil national life (Bermudez, 1996). It is a mechanism of un-
derstanding the role of the public sector. It is a social practice that 
has reached the level of acceptance and tolerance (Carvajal, 2012).    
With a government that has been captured by private interests, 
and business groups that are mostly rentiers, the negative performance 
of social and economic aspects in Colombia is highly influenced by 
a pecuniary behavior which helps to reproduce it.  In chapters 16 
and 24 of The General Theory Keynes exposes the disappearance of 
the rentier. Keynes states that the euthanasia of the rentier, who is a 
cumulative oppressive power given that he exploits the scarcity-value 
of the capital, is the only way to eliminate the functionless investor 
(Keynes, 1936). In Veblen’s terms this is the pecuniary motive of the 
business enterprise which clearly plays a role in the establishment in 
Latin America (Veblen, 1904). 
In The Theory of Business Enterprise Veblen argues that business 
men’s pecuniary motives strongly influence the state and the society’s 
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notion regarding the functioning of the society itself. Simply put, 
the pecuniary motives take the society to accept that business’ ends 
are the same government’s ends. The natural rights are the rhetoric 
to support such idea. That is “So long as there is no overt attempt 
on life, liberty of the person, or the liberty to buy and sell, the law 
cannot intervene, unless it be in a precautionary way to prevent 
prospective violation of personal or property rights. The “natural” 
conventional freedom of contract is sacred and inalienable”. Further, 
Veblen describes how the society’s notion regarding its functioning 
is altered: “it follows that, with the sanction of the great body of the 
people, even including those who have no pecuniary interests to serve 
in the matter, constitutional government has, in the main, become a 
department of the business organization and is guided by the advice 
of the business men” (Veblen, 1904).   
Veblen gives us the two institutions where the popular approval of 
the government rests: patriotism and property. Therefore, the outcome 
is the general acceptance of the democracy, free market economy, and 
the complete rejections to all those old systems that do not allow our 
apparent freedom. Veblen asserts that: “So that both businessmen 
whose gains are sought to be enhanced by business politics and 
the populace by whose means the business gains are secured work 
together in good faith towards as well advised business end, - the 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of those men who are skilled in 
pecuniary matters” (Veblen, 1904). 
Therefore, the Colombian government takes the form of predator 
one. It is influenced mostly by rentiers guided by pecuniary motives. 
Under these circumstances the government is in a servile function 
to the big business groups, the political class is the guarantor for 
those private interests, and the middle and low-income classes just 
believe there are not alternatives.  As J. Galbraith (2008) has asserted 
into the predator government “the regulation is a burden for some 
businesses, it is competitive blessing for others”. The blessed ones are 
the bigger business groups, the ones who are part of a leisure class, 
or are not necessarily big but keep a close relationship with those 
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in power. The same Colombian reality is not far from other Latin 
American countries. 
As Parada (2006) has asserted since the colonial times the gover-
nment is a position to obtain profits, it is an institution submerged 
in the pecuniary motives. Thus, we have a predator government 
under the administration of a political class serving to the particular 
interests. The establishment is nourished with the social distinction 
of being considered as a follower of democracy. Of course, the free 
market is always the answer. If there is some poverty or exclusion, it 
is owing to the mechanism of the market economy where there are 
winners and losers, but it will not be possible to talk about a structure-
agency conditioned by the establishment, a complex social process 
that makes possible a privileged class. In Dewey’s terms is described 
as “no social institution stands alone as a product of one dominant 
force. It is a phenomenon or function of a multitude of social factors 
in their mutual inhabitations and reinforcement” (Dewey, 1922). 
4. THE INSTITUTION OF THE LACK OF TRUST
As a social scientists, we know that clientelismo and the traffic of 
votes are not the only problems. There is an institution that plays a 
role in the predatory and ceremonial part of the social structure of 
Latin American nations. That is, the institution of the lack of trust. 
Of course, the conventional economics theory gives us a reasonable 
explanation of such developmental problems. It is enough to check 
the elements of the production function, like every standard introduc-
tory textbook in economics shows it. Once this is done, we conclude 
we do not produce for the market as the ideology of the free market 
demands. In Colombia like in other places in Latin America, rent-
seeking is the goal. 
Such production function includes physical capital (K), labor (L), 
the natural resources (R), and technology (A). This last one tends 
to be measured as a residual. It is not hard to figure the Colombian 
problem out through this production function. As a typical emergent 
economy, Colombia does not count with large amounts of capital. 
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Because either we do not (or even try to) produce it or we do not 
accumulate it. That is definitely something strange for a nation that 
claims to be capitalist. Without capital there is not a chance to gene-
rate material prosperity with positive effects over the people. Think 
about this, Colombia imports a lot of goods. Even goods that do not 
have a sophisticated level of technology and that we totally have the 
labor force with the necessary knowledge to pursue the production 
of such good. 
Regarding labor, Colombia is a country with a poor labor history. 
A strong conservative tendency is evident, because of the persecution 
against labor union leaders. In Colombia around 200 labor leaders 
get murdered and remain without being clarified the causes of the 
murderers (Echandia, 2013). In addition, the academic orthodox 
part claims the minimum wage is too high. The orthodox reasoning 
is well-known. Minimum wage is a point above the labor market 
equilibrium that causes supply to be greater than demand. This is 
what explains the supply excess or unemployment. Besides, there is 
literature in Colombia that points out that an increase in minimum 
wage only causes higher prices, which affect low-income households. 
Higher minimum wage does not have a positive effect over the poor, 
given this population is not benefited by it. The redistributive effects 
of the minimum wage in Colombia are overestimated (Posso, 2010; 
Lasso, 2010; Arango, Herrera, and Posada, 2008). The monetary 
orthodoxy in Colombia claim the minimum wage is an institutional 
rigidity that makes expensive to create jobs (Urrutia, 2001). We 
consider all these arguments overlook the fact that the real cause why 
Colombia does not create jobs is because of production rigidities. The 
capital accumulation in Colombia is not centered on the sphere of 
production, but in the exchange sphere. Such sphere is from where 
the orthodoxy only observes the world. Yet, the problem of Colombia 
is not an exchange problem, it is a productive one. It is that we do 
not have developed an industrial and productive ethics. 
The previous ideas allow asserting that Colombia is a nation that 
has not exploited its potential with regard to technological capabi-
lities. It has not done the attempt to become self-sufficient in the 
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production of goods and services on which Colombia counts with 
decent sources of capital, labor and a technology that should not be 
hard to replicate (and even improve) by Colombians. For instance, 
we claim Colombia has plenty of potential to be self-sufficient in the 
production and processing in the food industry. That could be a good 
starting point. Yet, speculative behavior dominates the context where 
such industry operates. It is recognized all the deliberate destruction 
of food surplus by certain companies with the objective of charging 
higher prices. This is what makes evident our point that what really 
matters is how we use the technology. It is not only enough to have 
technology, but to operate it instrumentally. 
By definition, if labor, capital, and technology are not being used 
efficiently to enhance the social provisioning process, the least we can 
expect is that the natural resources are not well utilized. The historical 
tendencies with regard cattle raising in the Caribbean region of Co-
lombia proves this point. The real potential of the land is agriculture, 
but cattle raising is practiced instead because it generates rents and 
does not demand high levels of investment. Once again, this is not 
the representative behavior within capitalism. Needless to mention 
the land concentration issue. The property land concentration reaches 
a Gini coefficient of 0.862 in Colombia (IGAC, 2012).  
All these problems demonstrate, in conventional economics 
terms, that the possibilities production frontier is weak. It clearly 
proves that Colombia has production rigidities. This is a structural 
weakness that makes inflation a potential threat. Not because the 
minimum wage is too high, but because we have not embraced the 
spirit of capitalism: production to accumulate and expand. Hence, 
in a material context like this, it is just logical that people adopt 
the institution of lack trust. Colombians do not trust in their judi-
cial system. High crime rates in certain regions prove that justice 
by their own hands is the standard procedure to follow. The sense 
of community is weak. Accepting help from a strange could be a 
risky situation. It is better to not to trust anyone. The lack of trust 
institution is reflected in the routinary behavior. Colombians do not 
strictly follow the traffic rules, or the place of someone on the line 
revista de economía del caribe 20 (2017) págs. 107-130 [121]
William R. Baca Mejía, Sarah M. Walsh Rone
either in grocery store or a bank (Garay, 2003). We do not believe 
this is because human beings are selfish due to their human nature. 
This is clearly a social construction. The lack of opportunities both in 
the economic and political front are enough to explain this behavior. 
Before the absence of a strong government that makes possible the 
socialization and collectivization of public goods and investment, the 
sense community does not emerge. Cooperativism and solidarity are 
valued as weakness. Instead individualism is more valued, it is the 
exit out to any uncertain situation. Thus, the rule of law that is a 
social goal does not match with the individualistic behavior. 
The lack of trust institution in Colombia is the reason why this 
is a country where for even the smallest errand we do, it does require 
considerable amount of paperwork to prove that the action to be 
pursued is legitimate. The principle of good faith is not part of social 
values system in several Latin American nations.
5. IS THERE ANY WAY TO GET OUT 
OF THIS ESTABLISHMENT?
I turn next to the search for insights that favor an institutional change 
in Latin America. It is time to find out if there is a way to get out 
of this apparently unchanged establishment.  We do this examining 
the insights with respect to institutional change of Veblen, Dewey, 
Ayres, Commons, and Foster. 
Veblen suggested a dichotomous idea between technology and 
institutions/ceremony as an attempt to explain institutional change. 
Emphatically, the biological instincts (i.e. instinct of workmanship, 
idle curiosity, and parental bend) play an important role in the indivi-
dual and collective action concerning their involvement into the social 
process. It is necessary to underline that Veblen’ idea on institutional 
change cannot be reduced to technological or biological determinism. 
Regarding this, Parada (2006) points out that: “It implies an idea 
of systematic feedback in the whole system that cannot be reduced 
to the positivist view of endogenous and exogenous variables, where 
human beings as living creatures play a crucial role, changing their 
own environment. Indeed, human agency, individual and collective, 
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is at the core of the whole system, far from cultural or biological 
determinism, and crude behaviorism”.  In short, Veblen’s notion on 
institutional change is a process where material transformations of 
life could alter the institutional setting.  
Dewey (1922) asserts that “habits of thought outlive modifica-
tions in habits of overt action”. He points that “the moral effects 
of even great political revolutions (…) do not show themselves till 
after the lapse of years. A new generation must come upon the scene 
whose habits of mind have been formed under the new conditions”. 
This means we need a change in our expectations about the context 
which surrounds us; otherwise the institutional change will not be 
possible. He makes this point clearer by asserting: “where general 
and enduring moral changes do accompany an external revolution 
it is because appropriate habits of thought have previously been 
insensibly matured. The external change merely registers the re-
moval of an external superficial barrier to the operation of existing 
intellectual tendencies”.  In other words, if previous conditions (i.e. 
habits of thoughts) are positive to the suggested change, there really 
will be a change.  
Turning to Ayres’ insights, he considered that there were two 
forces: technology and ceremonialism, each of them affecting human 
behavior. On the one hand, technology should not be restricted to 
tools. It implies all human activities articulated with the use of tools 
going from the stone to mathematical symbols (Parada, 2006). On 
the other hand, the ceremonial aspect is explained through the use 
of tools with the goal of social distinction within the society. About 
social change, Ayres points out that “we know with certainty that 
inventions and discoveries are combinations of tools, instruments, and 
instrumentally manipulated materials; and that the more tools there 
are, the greater the potential of technological innovation and disco-
very”. This is what causes the change in learned habits of thought. 
This complex process of technological innovation is the dynamic force 
in social change (Ayres, 1944). The essence of Ayres’s idea regarding 
institutional change will be based on who will dominate over who 
i.e. “the outcome of a society was determined by the forward urging 
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of its technology and the backward pressure of its ceremonial system” 
(Parada, 2006). All the complex processes that make possible techno-
logical innovations do not necessarily allow technological advances 
as progressive and positive for the society. 
On the other hand, it is not easy to identify Commons’ source of 
institutional change. Basically, his thinking of collective and indivi-
dual action helps to understand his insight with regard to this issue. 
Collective action is necessary to limit the individual action through 
time. Nonetheless, each new institutional change is linked with its 
evolutionary sense given that common law is its main referent. Under 
these circumstances “the changing customs of the dominant portion 
of the people at the time and formulating them, by a rationalizing 
process of justification, into working rules for future collective action 
in control of individual action” (Commons, 1934). Commons empha-
sizes that “within this changing complexity and uncertain futurity 
they must act now. It is out of these complexities and uncertainties 
that the concepts of reasonable practices and reasonable values emerge 
and change the institutions themselves from day to day and age to 
age”. In short, the change is possible through the reasonable value 
implemented by the society. The way we value social processes can 
change. Naturally, when an institution like the Supreme Court in the 
United States interprets such change in the value systems, changes 
become legalized and accepted
We should recall the common law is not an extended feature in 
the Latin America, but the constitutional court plays a key role in 
the setting of the working rules for society. In the Colombian case, 
the constitutional court has established as mandatory for the central 
bank that its macroeconomic stability concept should not be only 
price stability, but also full employment. The same court has impeded 
the indefinite presidential reelection. Other issues have been studied 
by the constitutional court in Colombia as owner-labor conflict, gen-
der exclusion, and civil rights recognition to the LGBT community 
(Safford and Palacios, 2002). The central point is that the value of an 
independent constitutional court can exert changes for the society. 
For it is constantly interpreting the society’s value system. 
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With regard to Foster’s insight, he sees society in an evolving pro-
cess and where the development of technology permanently generates 
adjustment in institutions. These institutions can be instrumental 
functions or ceremonial ones. To Foster there is not a contradiction 
between institutions and technology when he described social pro-
gress. This is because he believes that technology has ceremonial and 
instrumental features. The same applies for institutions. The institu-
tional change in Foster is conceived as the way through instrumental 
efficiency of the institutions is increased by human agency (Parada, 
2006). Foster states three principles that show the self-questioning 
process and deliberation whereby human agency goes through. The 
principles are: 1) the principle of instrumental determination, which 
explains that human agency realizes that a ceremonial institution has 
to be replaced by an instrumental one. Also, human agency unders-
tands that is possible due to we have the technological capabilities to 
pursue so. This is when collective and individual agency knows that 
is possible to reach structural change; 2) the principle of recognized 
interdependence, describes the institutional change will affect some 
portion of the society where such is taking place. Someone will be 
affected. Any institutional change has to identify such affections over 
the others. This a moment when collective and individual agency 
knows there is social tension; 3) the principle of minimal dislocation 
states the institutional change has a rate of change. It has limits. Such 
change has to take into account those who are considerably affected 
by the change. We believe minimal dislocation is a theoretical possi-
bility for social changes that are reached via consensual mechanisms. 
Yet, there is the possibility of maximal dislocation, whereby there 
is not room for consensual mechanisms but conflictual. The third 
principle makes emphasis on the fact that social conflict exists and 
can be carried out through consensus attainments or conflict-based 
ones (Foster, 1981; Sherman and Dugger, 2000). 
All these authors have showed us that society works in a complex 
process of relationships between structures and collective and indivi-
dual agency. Technology, i.e., the mechanic way we do things and the 
social way we do things, appears to be the path for the institutional 
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change. This should not be confused with technological determinism. 
Because we are emphasizing the role of technology over the material 
conditions of life of people. Veblen states in The Theory of the Leisure 
Class that “the transition from peace to predation therefore depends on 
the growth of technical knowledge and the use of tools”. But Veblen 
states that this transition defines the mechanical and social way we 
do things. In the end such transition was driven by “the predatory 
phase of culture conceived on gradually, through a cumulative growth 
of predatory aptitudes, habits, and traditions” (Veblen, 1899). The 
technological change is mediated by institutions endogenously and 
not exogenously as the mainstream economics presumes.
We should not forget Dewey’s idea that the change has to be ac-
companied with a general acceptance of the new expectations created 
by the proposed change. This last point is important for the Latin 
American cases. These countries have received technology in some 
extent, but it has been exclusively put to serve the establishment. It 
is time to turn our attention toward the conclusions of these insights. 
They allow us to set theoretical ideas regarding the instinct of work-
manship, idle curiosity, and parental bend, about to incentive them 
to rise and contribute to innovation and technology. But in a way 
our material aspect life changes, suggesting this the way we think 
has to adapt to the new circumstances. This is how social change 
becomes necessary.  
6. CONCLUSIONS
The establishment is a habit of thought. It is sustained by the cere-
monial feature of the free market ideology. The ceremonial is explicit 
when the belief exists that free market is the perfect way to enhance 
democracy. Democracy is a general desire of the Latin American po-
pulation induced by this ideological belief. Therefore, the free market 
solution is accepted by all members of the unequally stratified Latin 
American society. 
The problem of this ceremonial path is that free market reforms 
have not had positive effects. This means they have not manifested 
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in a better democracy for Latin America. There is still the traditional 
way to do politics: clientelismo and buying of votes. Furthermore, there 
are not sources of good jobs and income (i.e. they are informal). The 
industrial employment has declined in a sustained way since early 
1990s. Colombia imports too much and has supply rigidities, for it 
is evident it does not produce certain products that are not beyond 
its technological capabilities. It is a mercantilist type of capitalism: 
buying cheap to sell expensive. Capital accumulation takes place 
without a sustained real production foundation.  Thus, poor people 
do not have an alternative and accept their role in succumbing to 
predatory behavior.  
Although there is a market economy with some social benefits3 
allocated by the government, poverty and misery are persistent. Poor 
people would be worse off if they did not accept these minimum be-
nefits. Even though the political class, specifically in the Colombian 
case, is in its majority of a predatory kind, there are some alternatives 
which are independent of these practices and continuously in the last 
15 years have made appearance in national politics. In fact these alter-
natives have struck the old and predator alternatives in cities as Bogota 
and Medellin. It has emerged a form of citizen control movements, 
e.g. the Electoral Observation Mission, to denounce abuses of the 
political class during the elections. Therefore, there are alternatives 
with a new approach to politics and governance; an approach that 
is more convenient to underprivileged people. This could mean the 
beginning of the self-questioning and deliberative processes. 
Taking into account there are alternatives in this pecuniary politi-
cal context, the quality of the education will be a definitive element. 
The more educated the people the more critic they will be regarding 
the national situation. This will encourage a national consciousness 
for change. In Colombia we have advanced in education coverage 
although it is not only the optimal goal. A qualified and democratic 
3  Most of these social benefits are based on just assist poor people and not 
in change their structural problems. 
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education will be the underpinning for a better context where rewards 
to the individual and collective productive efforts are possible. 
Here we are calling for a change in values and attitudes of the 
population. We do need entrepreneurs and not more rentiers, and a 
regional industrial policy that links our rural economies, which are 
focused on activities that underestimated their real potential (e.g., 
extensive cattle raising), with our urban economies. We do need a 
new concept of macroeconomic stability as the constitutional court 
has required. The fiscal deficit must start not to be seen as a sin, but 
as an instrument for full employment and price stability altogether 
with a regulatory framework that does not bless big business groups 
and detains the conspiracy of monopolies and oligopolies against the 
middle and low-income classes. Free market policies have to be abo-
lished. The only outcome these policies have left is a well-positioned 
distinctive social class at cost of increasing social exclusion. 
The establishment will be out of the Colombians’ minds once there 
are alternatives: a decent employment opportunity, a democratic and 
qualified education, and a justice not considered as an instrument 
for social distinction, but as an authority that citizens can trust. We 
need these tools to allow the instinct of workmanship, parental bend, 
and idle curiosity work into society without predatory behavior that 
limited them. 
Apparently the original institutional economists cited above 
taught us the only way is through a material transformation of life. 
Though we know that some of them have some methodological 
problems, the most important thing to recall is that if we believe 
that technology advances are the basis of change, we shall be misun-
derstanding their lessons. We cannot assert the establishment will 
disappear only through technological advances. We do not forget they 
also concluded that the social complex process is constantly evolving 
and social absorption of technology depends upon what the habits of 
thought of society do with it. We should consider that promoting 
change with the recommendations mentioned above, individual and 
collective agency will have a better answer against the structure (in 
this case the establishment). In this way, technological advances will 
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be possible, not exclusively in the sense of more sophisticated ma-
chines but in the sense of an efficient social provisioning that allows 
a far better livelihood for society. It seems neither as a hard task or 
impossible. It is a long-term evolving process.   
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